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Introduction
A commonly held view is that fiscal federalism promotes innovative public programs, speeds up the process of policy experimentation and its diffusion. This view has been recently expressed by the U.S federal government with regards to abatement technologies. The administration's chief climate negotiator, Harlan Watson, defended the U.S climate policy listing a variety of initiatives by states and communities. This 'bottom-up approach' is based on the fact that states are like 'laboratories where new and creative ideas and methods can be applied and shared with others and inform federal policy. ' 1 This view is rooted in the argument that the division of the economy into a number of independent localities gives them the opportunity to experiment with policies. With several jurisdictions experimenting, the likelihood of finding the best policy is higher than if the control of the policy choice is left to the central government. 2 This view is most vividly summarized in the following citation by Justice Brandeis:
'It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. ' 3 While this statement has received widespread support, recent theoretical analysis suggests the contrary: a decentralized system is conducive to producing fewer policy innovations than a centralized one. This might be the case, for instance, either because of political risk-as in Rose-Ackerman (1980)-or because of a horizontal information externality, as in Strumpf (2002) . This latter contribution considers a model in which local policymakers decide on policy experiments the outcomes of which are correlated across states. This correlation creates a learning externality and therefore an incentive for the policymakers to free-ride on each other's innovative efforts. This incentive to free ride leads, typically, to under-experimentation relative to the social optimum that could be generated by a unitary government. 4 An important aspect that is insightfully discussed but not formally investigated by Rose-Ackerman [8] and Strumpf [9] (section 4.3) concerns the federal political institutions and, more importantly, the electoral incentives faced by the state policymakers in a federal system. It is quite common observation that in federal systems regional governors run for federal office. Consider, for instance, the U.S experience. With the exception of George Bush senior all of America's past five presidents previously have been state governors. The same is true, to give another example, for Germany where four out of the last five chancellors were ex-premiers of federal states. Though this does not show the innovativeness of the governors prior to the federal elections, it does show their level of political aspirations.
Undoubtedly, the implementation of new and unknown public policies is more demanding than running 'business as usual', since it requires imaginative leadership on the part of a governor rather than operational routine. If innovative public policies are viewed by the electorate as a signal of imaginative leadership, and hence a reasonable proxy for ability, one would expect that political aspirations are interdependent with the choice of public policies. It is so reasonable to assume that in federal contests, being innovative at the state level, positively influence the voters' perception of the ability of a governor standing for federal office. 5 In this paper we incorporate political aspirations for federal office into an analysis of policy experimentation by local jurisdictions and identify the forces at work that shape the incentives to experiment in a federal system.
We also identify a specific parameter constellation in which a federal economy generates more innovation than a unitary system and, therefore, show that the possibility that a federal system may generate more public policy innovation, validating the conventional wisdom that has been vividly expressed in the quotation by Justice Brandeis, is a real one. 6 In the model presented in Section 2, two state governors, each of whom can be of different ability, choose between several experimental policies and a policy with a certain outcome. After the policy has been implemented, both governors run for the federal presidency and the winner of the elections chooses a federation-wide policy. In this framework a learning externality, arising from correlation of policy outcomes across jurisdictions, exists. This creates incentives for each governor to avoid the cost of experimentation and, if elected president, to make use of the information procured in the other state. This incentive, however, is mitigated by two effects: the signaling and the policy effect. The former effect, and to some extent the most obvious, refers to the incentive of a governor to signal ability to the electorate by experimenting in order to win the elections. The policy effect refers to the nature of the federal political career: a governor anticipating to become president and then to govern the entire nation will take into account the benefit procured to the other state by her own choice of policy experimentation. It is the combination, and strength, of these two effects that makes governors opt for the experimenting public policy.
The outcome of this federal setup is compared with a benchmark of a unitary nation where a president is responsible for the entire federation. For the unitary case, we distinguish between a non-democratic benchmark without election, and a nationwide election where the incumbent president has to face a challenger from the opposition. It is shown that the federal system is more innovative than both benchmarks provided the signalling and policy effects are stronger than the learning externality.
the equilibrium of the model, and Section 4 compares it to the unitary outcome without election. In Section 5 the model is varied to allow for an election in the unitary system. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
The model
We study a dynamic two period model which incorporates signaling and an election between both periods. 7 We abstract, for simplicity, from discounting between the two periods. There are two states that are identical in all respects. In period 1 in each state a governor is in charge of choosing policy. In the end of that period both governors run for the federal presidency. In period 2 the president selects policy for both states. 8 Policymakers are of two abilities: high, denoted by α, and low, denoted by α , with, in particular, α > α > 0. Ability is private information. Each policymaker is of high ability with probability λ ∈ (0, 1). The abilities of the two governors are independent of each other.
In both periods incumbents decide whether to introduce one out of m new and innovative public policies where m is a large number. The returns of these policies are probabilistic and depend on the policymaker's ability. In particular, exactly one of the new policies has a high quality, 9 denoted by q h + α, while the other m − 1 new policies are of low quality, denoted by q l + α, where α = α, α and q l > 0. 10 Thus, if there is an experiment with one new policy, it is of high quality with probability θ ≡ 1/m. Alternatively, the policy makers may use a public policy whose return is certain and given by q o . This policy can have a dual interpretation: it can be either an old one that 7 A variant of this model in the context of a single jurisdiction can be found in Kotsogiannis and Schwager (forthcoming). 8 The issue at the heart of the paper is to compare the incentives of governors for experimentation arising within a given federal election. Two states are sufficient for this purpose. We also abstract from incentive considerations arising from the re-election of the president of the federation after period 2. 9 Policies are costly and, without loss of generality, their cost has been suppressed. 10 Combining ability and random policy outcome in an additive specification is a convenient way to describe the main effects while keeping the notational burden to a minimum. has been used in the past or a new policy with a certain return. The policies are ranked according to
(1)
The inequalities in (1) guarantee that the return of new policy of high quality chosen by a low ability policymaker, q h + α, is larger that the return of a new policy that is of low quality but is chosen by a high ability policymaker, q h + α. Or to put this differently, the difference in the qualities of the policies q h − q l is larger than the difference in abilities α − α.
Central to this paper are the incentives of the policymakers to experiment with innovative public policies and so it is imperative to restrict attention to a policy innovation which is not from the outset superior to the old policy. We, therefore, assume that, for the high ability policymaker the return from old policy is greater than the expected return from the new policy that is,
It is clear from (2) that for the inequality to hold it must be the case that
(3) simply says that the innovative policy does not provide a short run benefit to a governor, 11 and so any incentive to innovate arises from the dynamic nature of the model. We turn to this next.
During the first period, citizens observe the quality q i (q i = q h + α, q h + α, q o , q l + α, q l +α) of the policy in both states and form beliefs about the ability of both governors.
The posterior probability that the governor of state i is of high ability given the quality q i of the policy is denoted by µ i (q i ). At the end of the first period there is an election.
Voting is retrospective and citizens elect for president the governor who is more likely to be of high ability. That is, if µ i > µ j , i = 1, 2, i = j, then citizens elect for president the governor of state i. In case µ i = µ j they toss a coin and each governor is elected with
The outcome of a specific experimenting policy is perfectly correlated across states.
This implies that, once a certain new policy is chosen in state i its quality becomes common knowledge also in state j. 12 Consequently, if a successful experiment was performed, in the sense that an innovative policy turned out to be of high quality, whoever is in charge of the policy decision in period 2 can use this information in both jurisdictions.
The sequence of events is illustrated in figure 1.
Insert figure 1 here.
Policymakers derive utility from the per-period quality of the policy chosen provided they are in office. In period 2 the governor who is not elected president receives zero utility. Specifically, this implies that being ousted from office confers lower utility than any policy outcome.
This model defines a game between both types of the policymakers in both states.
At the beginning of the game Nature chooses the ability type of both governors. A strategy for each type of governor in state i = 1, 2 consists, first, of a policy decision for state i in the first period. The second component is a rule, possibly depending on the policy outcomes observed in period 1, that specifies the policy choices for both states in period 2, should the governor of state i be elected as president. An equilibrium of this game consists of a strategy for each ability type of the governor of each state and of citizens' beliefs satisfying two requirements. Firstly, given the beliefs of the citizens and the strategies of both types of governor in state j = i, the strategy of the governor of state i has to be optimal whenever this governor is called upon to decide. Secondly, the beliefs must be consistent with the governors' strategies.
We start by analyzing the president's choices in the second period after the first period election. In the second period the president has no re-election motives and thus chooses the policy which yields her the highest expected quality. This expected quality is determined as follows. First, there may have been an experiment in the first period which has proved successful. If this is the case, the president is informed that this new policy is of high quality. Consequently, she then chooses this new policy in both states yielding a payoff 2(q h + α) where α = α, α is the president's ability. If one or both governors tried out new policies but each of these policies showed to be of low quality, the president, following the ranking of policies in (3), returns to the old policy obtaining the payoff 2q o . 13 The same decision is optimal if no state has experimented with a new policy.
As noted in the introductory section, the purpose of this analysis is to investigate possible interdependencies between political aspirations of state governors for federal office and the choice of innovative public policies and, thus, explore the possibility that a federal system produces more experimentation relative to a unitary system. To progress towards this we thus concentrate our efforts on establishing the existence of a particular equilibrium: that in which in both jurisdictions the low ability governor selects the old policy whereas the high ability governors in both states experiment, but each governor is choosing a different new policy. 14 This candidate equilibrium leads to beliefs of the form
Consider now, given these beliefs, the choices open to a high ability governor in state 13 Since a new policy chosen in the first period has been eliminated from the pool of new policies, the probability of finding a high quality new policy in the second period will be updated. An updated version of (3) then holds if m is sufficiently large. This allows us to not worry about the precise values of the updated probabilities in every eventuality.
14 A full characterization of the equilibria of the model can be provided. This, however, will not provide any further insights into the effects leading to innovation in a federal system. For the sake of brevity these equilibria are therefore omitted.
i, assuming that the governor of state j = i behaves according to the hypothesized strategies. If the governor of state i chooses a new policy her expected first period payoff is given by
By this choice, she reveals her high ability to the electorate, ensuring a belief µ i = 1. If the governor of state j is of high ability, her strategy being the same, she also reveals her type implying µ j = 1. In this case the governor of state i wins the election with probability 1/2. Since, under these strategies, there were two different experiments performed, it is clear that the probability that the policy, in the second period, is of high quality is 2θ, while with probability 1 − 2θ, both experiments have failed. Conditional upon winning the election against a high ability competitor from the other state the expected second period payoff of the governor of state i is thus
If, now, the governor of state j is of low ability she chooses the old policy which leads to, following (4), µ j = 0, ensuring that the governor of state i is elected with probability 1. Since now the governor of state i is the only one who tried out a new policy, the probability that the policy, in the second period, is of high quality is just θ. Thus, if the governor of state j is of low ability, the second period payoff of the governor of state i is
To obtain the expected second period payoff of the governor of state i we first multiply (6) with the prior probability λ, for the event that the governor of state j is of the high ability type, and with the probability 1/2 of winning the election against this competitor.
Similarly we multiply (7) with λ and 1, and add the results. Adding the expected second period payoff to (5) finally yields the total payoff from choosing a new policy
In principle, the governor of state i could as well choose the same new policy as the governor of state j. With such a choice, in the payoff in (6), the probability 2θ for knowing a good new policy in period 2 would have to be replaced by θ, while the remaining components of the payoff would not change. Thus, choosing the same innovation as the other governor, is never preferred to choosing a different innovation.
If the governor of state i chooses the old policy the first period payoff is q o . Having chosen the old policy the governor of state i is taken to be, following (4), µ i (q o ) = 0, of low ability. If the governor of state j is of high ability, this happens with probability λ, the governor of state i is defeated in the elections obtaining zero second period payoff.
With probability 1 − λ the governor of state j is of low ability implying µ j = 0. In this case the governor of state i is elected with probability 1/2. Since no experiment has taken place, the second period payoff for the governor of state i in this case is 2q o . The total payoff from choosing the old policy, then, is
Comparing equations (8) and (9) it is immediate, following from (1) and in particular
. It is thus optimal for the high ability governor of state i to choose a new policy.
We now turn to the low ability type governor in state i. If this governor chooses the old policy then in the first period her payoff is q o . In this case she is defeated in the election, if the governor of state j is of high ability, and she is elected with probability 1/2, if the governor of state j is also of low ability. In the latter case the second period payoff, conditional on winning the election, is given by 2q o . Consequently, the total payoff from choosing the old policy for the low ability type, denoted by v g (o), is given by (9) .
If the low ability governor chooses the new policy in the first period then the first period benefit is given by (5), but with α replaced by α. In this case she is elected with probability 1/2 (1 − λ). Since there was one experiment in this case the expected payoff in the second period, conditional on being elected, is then given by
Combining first and second period payoffs one obtains
That is, the low ability governor of state i chooses the old policy if the likelihood that the new and innovative policy is relatively small in the sense that θ ≤ θ g . Following (1) , and in particular the facts that q o > q l + α and q h > q o > q l , θ g in (11) is strictly positive. A simple comparison of (3) and (11) now reveals that θ g is below the value of θ * , as defined in (3), if α is not too far below α. Restricting attention to this case, we arrive at:
Proposition 1 For all θ ∈ [0, θ g ] there exists an equilibrium where in both states the high ability governor experiments and the low ability governor selects the old policy.
We turn now to the benchmark case in which policies are chosen by the president of the unitary nation.
The unitary nation
The president of the unitary nation in the first period chooses the policy for each state. Consider the high ability type and the first of these options. Choosing different new policies in both states in the first period she obtains payoff, in each state, given by (5) . In the second period, having experimented twice in the first, she obtains a payoff given by (6) . Adding these payoffs one obtains
The second possible choice, consisting of the same new policy in both states gives the same first period payoff. In the second period, the payoff q h + α is obtained only with probability θ instead of 2θ. Therefore, this strategy is clearly dominated by the previous choice. If now she chooses the new policy in one state and the old in the other, in the first period she obtains payoff θ (q h + α)+(1−θ) (q l + α)+q o . In the second period, after one experiment she knows a successful new policy with probability θ, and thus receives the payoff given by (7) . Total payoff from this choice, then, is
Finally, if she chooses the old policy in both states she obtains a total payoff of
One would expect that the president of the unitary nation will be choosing in both states a different new policy, if the likelihood that the new policy is of good quality is sufficiently high. Indeed, comparison of the payoffs in (12) and (13), reveals that this is
A comparison now of equations (13) in the sense that θ ≤ θ p , it is optimal for this type not to innovate at all. It is easy to verify that the cutoff level of θ (θ p ) for the low ability president to innovate is strictly greater than the cutoff θ (θ p ) for the high ability. 15 This is intuitive. For, in this case, and with a given level of quality, the low ability president receives less payoff than she would if she was the high ability. Consequently, the low ability type is willing to choose the new policy if the new policy is more likely, vis a vis the cutoff level of θ required by the high ability, to be of high quality. Moreover, both θ p , θ p are positive. Finally, θ p is strictly less than θ * , which is also true for θ p provided that α is not too low. We so have:
Proposition 2 (i) For all θ ∈ [0, θ p ], it is optimal for both types of the president of the unitary nation to choose the old policy in both states.
(ii) For all θ ∈ [θ p , θ p ], it is optimal for the high ability type president of the unitary nation to choose two different new policies in both states. For the low ability type it is optimal to choose the old policy in both states.
(iii) For all θ ∈ [θ p , θ * ], it is optimal for both types of president of the unitary nation to choose new policies in both states.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in figure 2 .
Insert figure 2 here.
In order to compare the outcome in the federal system of Proposition 1 with that of the unitary system of Proposition 2 we now need to relate the critical values θ g and θ p .
A simple comparison between (11) and (15) (with α replaced by α) shows that θ p < θ g .
To progress further in the comparison, we now define a measure of innovation. The trade-off leading to the optimal decision of the president of the unitary nation, as stated in Proposition 2, is rather intuitive. On the one hand, innovation is costly because in expected terms a new policy fares worse than the old policy in period 1.
On the other hand, the information produced in period 1 by experimenting allows for a higher payoff in the second period. Therefore, if θ is not too low, as in case (ii) of Proposition 2 for the high ability type, and in case (iii) for both types, the learning benefit outweighs the short term cost of innovation. Hence, the president of the unitary nation finds it optimal to innovate. 16 If, conversely, θ is too low, then no innovation takes place in the unitary nation.
In the federal system the same trade-off exists because the governors, too, have an incentive to learn. The difference between the two systems arises from two considerations introduced by electoral competition. Firstly, with the probability for each governor of winning the election being less than one, the benefit of learning is not fully internalized. Secondly, the high ability governor enhances her electoral prospects by innovating, thereby communicating her ability to voters. For this type, the electoral benefit always outweighs the costs of innovation. To see this clearly, consider the extreme case where the new policy is of low quality with certainty, that is, θ = 0. Switching from the new to the old policy confers a first period gain of q o but in the same time reduces the probability of winning the election by 1/2. Since the second period payoff, conditional on being elected president, is 2q o , deviating to the old policy does not pay off. Thus, the high ability governor innovates even if there is no benefit from learning. Obviously, in the case where both governors are of high ability both have the same electoral motives to innovate. Consequently, in this case, there may be double innovation in the federal system even if the learning benefit is negligible.
A low ability governor prefers not to reveal her ability to the voters and hence she has no electoral motive for choosing the new policy. As a consequence, her decision is entirely determined by the trade-off faced also by the president of the unitary nation:
The trade-off, that is, between the short term costs of innovation and the benefit of learning. Because of the information externality, θ g , the minimum value for θ such that she innovates, is higher than θ p , the minimum value of θ required to induce the low ability type of the president of the unitary nation to innovate. For this reason, if θ is between these values, the federal system produces less innovation than the unitary nation. The comparison described in Proposition 3 is illustrated in figure 3 .
Insert figure 3 here.
Opposition candidates
In the present section, we change the model such that also the president has to stand for re-election. Lacking any competing incumbent from a different state, however, a challenger in such an election has to be an opposition politician who does not currently hold any office. Since this politician does not take any policy decision, citizens will believe that she is of high ability with the prior probability λ. In order to keep the institutional setups comparable, we also introduce a third contender, whose belief is given by the prior λ, in the election in the federal system. Finally, the behavior of the voters is essentially the same as before. Specifically, citizens elect the candidate to whom they assign the highest belief of being of high ability. If there are several such candidates, the votes will be split among them.
For the federal system, we again consider an equilibrium where high ability governors choose different new policies while low ability governors stick to the old policy.
This implies the same beliefs as in the equilibrium analyzed in Section 3. A governor who has chosen a new policy reveals her type, and any governor who chooses the old policy is taken to be of low ability. Thus, in such an equilibrium, a high ability governor who innovates still beats a low ability type governor with certainty. Moreover, she also beats the challenger since the voters assign only belief λ < 1 to this unknown contender.
Finally, if the other governor is also of high ability, the two governors are preferred to the challenger and elected with probability 1/2 each. Thus, for a high ability governor, the payoff from choosing a new policy remains v g (n) as given in (8) .
Contrary to this, if the governor chooses the old policy, her election chances are affected by the presence of the challenger. The reason is that the citizens prefer the challenger, who may be of high ability with positive probability, to any candidate whom they believe to be of low ability with certainty. By consequence, choosing the old policy results in a sure defeat, yielding a total payoff of q o . Since this is lower than the corresponding payoff v g (o) given in (9) in the model without opposition candidate, a governor of the high ability type will still choose to innovate for all θ.
By the same reasoning, the presence of the challenger makes it impossible for a low ability type governor to win the election. Whether she chooses the new or the old policy, citizens will always assign belief 0 to her and elect either the other governor or the challenger. As a consequence, the second period payoff of a low ability type governor is zero. This however, following on (3), eliminates any incentive to choose a new policy in the first period. To summarize, we note that the hypothesized equilibrium exists for all θ ∈ [0, θ * ].
In the unitary system, we now have a game between the presidents of both types, where in an equilibrium, citizens form beliefs consistent with the strategies of both types.
We consider equilibria such that a low ability type president chooses the old policy in both states whereas a high ability president innovates at least once. With these strategies, citizens will attach a belief of 0 to a president who chooses the old policy in both states.
Just like a low ability type governor, a low ability type president facing a challenger with belief λ will certainly lose the election. Since the old policy provides a higher payoff in the first period, it will therefore be chosen by the low type president in both states.
The high ability type president will be considered to be of the low ability type if she chooses the old policy in both states. Thus, after this first period choice she will lose the election against the challenger, implying a total payoff of 2q o . If instead she chooses a new policy in one state and the old policy in the other state, her high ability will be known to the electorate, ensuring a re-election with probability 1. Given that there was just one experiment in the first period, this yields an overall payoff v p (on) as given in (13).
This clearly exceeds 2q o , implying that it is not optimal for the high ability president
to choose the old policy in both states. Finally, choosing two different innovations in the two states, the president again is re-elected with certainty. Taking into account the fact that now there were two experiments, the total payoff in this case is v p (nn) as in For the high ability type, it now pays off to signal ability to voters, as it does for a high ability type governor. However, since there is only one president, one single innovation is sufficient to achieve this. This contrasts with the federal system where every high ability type governor wants to produce the signal. Therefore, for low values of θ, the federal system is still more innovative than the unitary system with elections, although the difference is smaller than in the case, studied in Proposition 3, without election in the unitary state. For the low ability type president, the contest with the challenger has the opposite effect. This type never innovates if she is subject to an election since she is ejected with certainty, and thus has no incentive at all to learn. When electoral competition is introduced, politicians with good prospects in the election invest more in winning, and so are more inclined to experiment. In the same time, those who expect to lose reduce their effort of finding solutions, the benefit of which will occur only after the end of their own term, and so decrease innovative activity. The first effect, however, is stronger in the federal system since all governors are potentially hopeful contenders for the presidency.
Insert figure 4 here.
Concluding remarks
Conventional wisdom has it that federalism promotes policy innovation. In contrast, recent research has emphasized that a multi-jurisdictional system is characterized by under-provision of policy innovation. The present paper has presented a simple model introducing political competition into the analysis of a federal system. Its objective has been to emphasize that political aspirations might play an important role in the determination of the level of experimentation in federal systems. For, as shown in the equilibrium analyzed, a tradeoff occurs between a learning incentive which is indeed stronger in a unitary system, and an electoral motive to signal ability by innovating which is stronger in the federal system. Thus, when the electoral motive dominates, policy innovation occurs more frequently than in a unitary nation. This shows that once such motives are accounted for, the conventional wisdom, that a federal system may be associated with more innovation relative to a unitary system, may be validated.
To put this result into perspective, the analysis has been purely positive and not normative.
It remains an open question whether the tendency to innovate in a federation is beneficial to citizens. To progress on this issue one would need to carefully specify the appropriate benchmark and, in particular, define, independently from the institutional setup, the set of policy makers from which the president in period 2 can be chosen.
presented here. The model thus suggests a number of extensions. Firstly, learning across states and between periods may be less than perfect. Secondly, the signal about the governor's ability conveyed by innovating may not be fully informative. Finally, another avenue for research is to incorporate other forms of political competition in federal systems. Certainly, there remains much scope for the analysis of experimentation in richer models of political competition. We hope to have shown that the task is worthwhile and that the conclusions can be instructive. 
